Report Number: 08-0000061
Report Date: 02/03/2008
Event Description
Five hours into the initial attack phase of a major wildland fire, a small volunteer fire department responded with a strike team of engines and reported to the incident command post. Since they did not have 800 MHz radios in their vehicles (they normally operate on VHF), the fire chief was given an 800 MHz portable radio and told what the command and tactical channels were for the incident. The strike team was then assigned to initial attack and structure protection on a [name deleted] high wind driven wildland fire.
The strike team leader made initial contact with the division supervisor in their assigned area and was instructed to assist other units performing structure protection in a mobile home park directly in the path of the fire. As the fire front approached the park, numerous mobile homes were ignited, visibility deteriorated significantly due to smoke conditions, and the fire spotted all around the firefighting units. The division supervisor ordered all units to evacuate the mobile home park and reposition to a safer area. All units except the volunteer strike team withdrew as instructed. The division supervisor assumed that all units had followed instructions and moved on with trying to catch the running wildland fire.
It was later learned that the strike team of volunteer engines never heard the order to evacuate the trailer park. The strike team was trapped in the back of the mobile home park with not way out. They made a defensive stand for several hours as the trailer park around them went up in flames. Several hours later, as the flaming fire front moved on and the intensity of fires between them and the park entrance diminished, the strike team was able to leave and re-engage in the firefight. The strike team leader later reported that he had 'lost communications' with the incident for several hours. He did not hear the order to withdraw from the trailer park and was unable to communicate with anyone on the incident to report the fact that the strike team was cut off and trapped.
No injuries or apparatus damage but potential for both was high.
Brackets [ ] in this report denote identifying information was removed by the reviewer.
Lesson Learned
1. Use every method possible to make sure that all units operating on an incident are able to communicate on incident radio frequencies. The frequent practice of have an entire strike team of engines depend on one person - the leader - with a radio on the incident radio frequencies, creates a potential point of communications failure that is almost inevitable.
2. Use extraordinary caution when personnel are given a new piece of complex equipment - such as a complex 800 MHz portable radio - in a high pressure situation with little time for training or familiarization.
3. Command personnel on complex incidents should have aides or assistants. The task of fire command of a rapidly evolving situation, combined with the rapid infusion of resources to the incident (often without face-to-face communications), combined with high volume radio traffic, makes resource accountability a major headache. Having an extra set of eyes & ears to assist with radio traffic, accountability, and record-keeping would help.
4. When tactical decisions to withdraw and redeploy resources are made, extra effort needs to be expended to assure that all units are accounted for. In the structure arena, we would do a PAR and a similar approach should be applied in this situation.
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